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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on 
January 22, 2001 
 
Before: NYGAARD, ALITO, and ROSENN, Cir cuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 27, 2001) 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Before us is Appellee Buckley Broadcasting's motion to 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Appellants 
have filed a memorandum in opposition. Buckley 
Broadcasting argues that we lack jurisdiction because the 
Appellants did not file their notice of appeal within thirty 
(30) days of the date the District Court's judgment became 
final, as required by F.R.A.P . 4(2)(1)(A). The Appellants 
maintain that such finality was not achieved until June 8, 
2000, and that their notice of appeal -- filed on June 21, 
2000 -- was therefore timely. 
 
I. Background 
 
On December 19, 1999, two hundred and eighty-eight 
(288) plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that several named 
defendants fraudulently solicited their investment in units 
of the Greater Columbia Basin Limited Liability Company. 
The purpose of this solicitation was to raise money for a 
wireless cable television system. Appellants (plaintiffs 
below) claimed that these investments were worthless and 
that the revenue generated was fraudulently diverted and 
has never been located or returned to them. 
 
Buckley Broadcasting was one of the named defendants. 
The only federal claim against Buckley Broadcasting was 
that it sold an unregistered security, as defined by section 
12(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. On December 
14, 1999, the District Court granted Buckley Br oadcasting's 
motion for summary judgment. The District Court found no 
genuine issue as to whether Buckley Broadcasting was a 
"seller" of securities within the meaning of the statute. The 
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District Court declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction with regard to the remaining state law claims 
and dismissed them. 
 
On January 13, 2000, the Appellants filed a notice of 
appeal contesting the December 14, 1999 order . Because 
their cause of action remained active as to several other 
defendants, the Appellants later voluntarily withdr ew the 
appeal, indicating that they reserved the right"to refile said 
appeal at such time as the Order of December 14, 1999 
becomes final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.S 1291 or is 
certified as such by Judge Politan."1  
 
On March 1, 2000, the District Court filed an order 
dismissing the action with respect to the r emaining 
defendants, expressing its belief that the matter had been 
settled with the two remaining defendants, W illiam 
Geronimo and Raymond Fillweber. The District Court 
dismissed the action "without costs and without prejudice 
to the right, upon good cause shown, within 60 days, to 
reopen the action if the settlement is not consummated." 
The order further instructed that "this case is now 
CLOSED." (emphasis in the original). That is to say, the 
Appellants had until Monday, May 1, 2000, to r e-open their 
case if the settlement fell through. 
 
The docket indicates that the Appellants undertook no 
action within the prescribed sixty (60) day period following 
entry of the District Court's order. It was not until May 4, 
2000, that the Appellants returned to the District Court 
and requested the entry of a "stipulation of dismissal with 
prejudice" as to Fillweber. On June 8, 2000, the Appellants 
requested a final stipulation of dismissal fr om the District 
Court for Geronimo. The Appellants filed a notice of appeal 
on June 21, 2000. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We note that although they voluntarily withdrew their appeal, 
Appellants did not seek to reinstate it. The fact that they "reserved the 
right to refile said appeal at such time as the Order of December 14, 
1999, becomes final within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. S 1291 or is 
certified by Judge Politan" is irrelevant.The requirements of F.R.A.P. are 
not discretionary. Such limitations are"mandatory and jurisdictional," 
and parties filing notices of appeal cannot r eserve the right to refile 
them 
more than thirty (30) days after a final judgment. Krebs Chrysler- 
Plymouth, Inc., v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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II. Jurisdiction and Final, Appealable Or ders 
 
For purposes of appellate jurisdiction, we must determine 
first whether there was a final order entered in this case 
and, if so, when it became appealable. Federal law provides 
that we shall have jurisdiction over appeals fr om "all final 
decisions of the District Courts of the United States." 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. A decision is consideredfinal for purposes of 
section 1291 when the District Court's decision"ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to 
do but execute the judgment." Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 710-11, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1718 (1996); 
see also Van Cauwenberghe v. Biar d, 482 U.S. 517, 521, 
108 S.Ct. 1945, 1949 (1988); Aluminum Com. of America v. 
Beazer East Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997); Christy 
v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 203 (3d Cir . 1997). Conversely, if the 
order specifically contemplates further activity by the 
District Court, it is not considered final. If the order 
contemplates only ministerial actions by the District Court 
however, finality may exist. See Paiewonsky Assoc. Inc. v. 
Sharp Props. Inc. 998 F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
An order dismissing a case outright is, of course, final 
and appealable. Trent v. Dial Med. of Florida et al., 33 F.3d 
217, 220 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. 
Callison, 844 F.2d 133, 134-35 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1988)). We 
have even indicated that dismissals "without pr ejudice" 
may be final and appealable if the District Court believes its 
ruling ends the litigation. See id. (citing United States v. 
Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1, 69 S.Ct. 
824, 825 n.1 (1949)). We have cautioned, however, that 
such dismissals could not be appealable until the party 
seeking relief renounces any intention to reinstate 
litigation. Id.; see also Tier nan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 
1031 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
III. The March 1, 2000 Order 
 
Buckley Broadcasting initially argues that the March 1, 
2000, order required no further action by the District Court 
and was therefore final and appealable on that date. 
Buckley Broadcasting points out that the Mar ch 1, 2000 
order dismissed the case, leaving it open only so that the 
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District Court may, upon a showing of good cause, r etain 
jurisdiction if a settlement was not consummated. 
Additionally, they suggest that the March 1st order did not 
reserve for the District Court the jurisdiction to re-examine 
the case on the merits, or the ability to enter any further 
substantive orders; the Court expressly closed the case. 
 
However, the District Court dismissed all claims without 
prejudice, giving the Appellants sixty (60) days to reinstate 
their action if a settlement was not reached. This condition 
is problematic. When a District Court dismisses a case 
pending settlement, and grants the Appellants leave to re- 
file within a set period of time, the order cannot be 
considered final for the purposes of appeal on the date it 
was entered. Typically, conditional dismissals based on 
imminent settlement include a fixed period of time to reach 
settlement terms. While these types of dismissals may keep 
the parties' "feet to the fire" by giving them a deadline to 
conclude settlement, they cannot be consider ed final. 
Instead, if terms are reached, and/or the plaintiff makes no 
attempt to re-open the litigation, the or der ripens into a 
final, appealable order upon the expiration of the fixed time 
period. 
 
It is a "well-settled principle" in this cir cuit that an order 
dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not a final and 
appealable order unless, for example, the plaintiff no longer 
can amend the complaint because the statute of limitations 
has run or if the plaintiff has elected to stand on their 
pleadings. In re Westinghouse Secs. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 705 
(3d Cir. 1996); see also Bethel v. McAllister Bros. Inc., 81 
F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996); Deutsch v. United States, 67 
F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995); Pr esbytery of N.J. Orthodox 
Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F .3d 1454, 1461 & n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Batoff v. State Far m Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d 
Cir. 1991); Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P . v. Harrison, N.J., 907 
F.2d 1408, 1416-17 (3d Cir. 1990). While the order of 
dismissal in this case was not final and appealable when it 
was entered, we find the Appellants' failur e to do anything 
in the subsequent sixty (60) day period akin to standing on 
their complaint, thereby making the order both final and 
appealable on May 1, 2000. 
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Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 instructs that "in 
a civil case . . . the notice of appeal requir ed by Rule 3 
must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the 
judgment or order appealed from is enter ed." F.R.C.P. 
4(a)(1)(A). An untimely appeal does not vest an appellate 
court with jurisdiction. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of 
Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978); Mar cangelo v. Boardwalk 
Regency, 47 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1995). Since the order 
became final and appealable on May 1, 2000, the notice of 
appeal filed by the Appellants on June 21, 2000, was not 
timely. We lack jurisdiction to review this case and will, 
therefore, dismiss. 
 
The Appellants argue that their filing and 
communications with the District Court clearly indicated 
that the litigation was not to be consideredfinal until the 
filing of stipulations of dismissal with pr ejudice. As 
evidence of this intention, they refer to an ex parte letter 
sent to the District Court on March 1, 2000, in which the 
Appellants outlined their plans to achieve settlement with 
the remaining defendants, Geronimo and Fillweber. We are 
not persuaded. The judicial process works best when orders 
mean what they say. See Adams v. Lever Br os. Co., 874 
F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 1989). The District Court's order is 
clear and unambiguous. Just as parol evidence is excluded 
in contracts cases when the plain language is clear , so too 
this type of ex parte evidence about a party's intentions 
must be considered irrelevant to an unequivocal and final 
order. 
 
Finally, the filing of "stipulations of voluntary dismissal 
with prejudice" on May 4, 2000, and on June 8, 2000, do 
nothing to rescue the untimely notice of appeal. We view 
them as superfluous. Geronimo and Fillweber were already 
dismissed from this case on March 1, 2000. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The March 1, 2000, dismissal order in this case is final 
and became appealable on May 1, 2000. Because the 
Appellants did not file their notice of appeal until June 21, 
2000, we lack the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate this 
appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. 
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